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Pain and Suffering Damages in Personal
Injury Cases: An Empirical Study
Yun-chien Chang,* Theodore Eisenberg, Tsung Hsien Li, and
Martin T. Wells
Many jurisdictions award pain and suffering damages, yet it is difficult for judges or juries to
quantify pain. Several jurisdictions, such as California, cap pain and suffering damages or
other noneconomic damages, and legal scholars have proposed ways to control such
damages. Reforms and proposals, however, have been based on limited empirical evidence.
It remains an open question whether components of economic damages explain pain and
suffering damages. This study employs a unique dataset of Taiwan district court cases and
uses detailed information on the components of pecuniary damages. Pain and suffering
damages highly correlate with the plaintiff’s medical expenses, level of injury, and the
amount requested by the plaintiff. The association with the amount requested by the
plaintiff persists when one accounts for the likely quantifiable influences on pain and
suffering damages, evidence of a possible anchoring effect. The strong correlation between
economic damages and noneconomic damages persists in a large U.S. dataset of judge and
jury trials, in which the noneconomic fraction of total damages is no greater than the pain
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and suffering fraction of total damages in Taiwan. Judges and juries consistently produce
coherent patterns of noneconomic damages.
I. Introduction
Pain and suffering and other noneconomic damages awarded by courts have generated
much normative and policy debate in the United States (see, e.g., Bovbjerg et al. 1988;
Croley & Hanson 1995; Geistfeld 1995, 2005; McCaffery et al. 1995; Viscusi 1996,
2007:120; Diamond et al. 1998; Vidmar et al. 1998; Niemeyer 2004; Avraham 2005, 2006;
Rabin 2005; Sharkey 2005; Sugarman 2006; Ubel & Loewenstein 2008). Concerns about
the unpredictability of damages have led to controversial caps on noneconomic dam-
ages,1 such as the California Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) of
1975,2 and to caps on punitive damages in many states (Miceli & Stone 2013:114–15).
Statutes capping damages have generated much litigation under U.S. state constitutions
(Love 2012). Whether pain and suffering damages and other noneconomic awards are
too capricious is also an important question in European legal systems (Karapanou &
Visscher 2010a; Flatscher-Th€oni et al. 2013, 2014). In Taiwan, doctors have long con-
tended that the medical malpractice law, which can lead to millions of Taiwan dollars
(NTD) in pain and suffering damages, has caused the younger generation of doctors to
choose high-profit and low-risk specialties, such as plastic surgery and dentistry, rather
than surgery. The highest judicial authority in Taiwan, the Judicial Yuan, has commis-
sioned a leading tort scholar to develop a regression model to help judges determine
the amount of pain and suffering damages. In short, the stakes of assessing whether
pain and suffering damages are reasonable and predictable are high.
From the law and economics perspective, a prerequisite for the torts system to
achieve optimal deterrence is setting damages at expected losses (if not the actual
losses) of victims (Shavell 2004:240–43). Nonetheless, even when willingness to pay/
accept is taken as the benchmark for quantifying pain and suffering, it is still difficult
for judges to set expected losses accurately (for the difficulty of assessing the value of
life, cf. generally Sunstein 2014:85–136). As Shavell (2004:242) notes, in the case of non-
pecuniary losses, the better approach is using simple tables or formulas to assess pain
and suffering damages to save administrative costs. Indeed, Ramseyer’s (2015:10–34)
study on the Japanese torts system shows that because the Japanese Supreme Court uses
publicly available tables to assess pain and suffering damages and court-published
1For instance, 31 states have adopted caps on noneconomic damages or total damages in medical malpractice
lawsuits (Paik et al. 2016). Pain and suffering damages also are an instance of unbounded damages, which gener-
ate positively skewed award distributions (Kahneman et al. 1998; Guthrie et al. 2000), which in turn lead to
reform proposals (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1998).
2Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.2 (West 1997 & Supp. 2013). MICRA limits damages for noneconomic losses in actions for
professional negligence against health-care providers to $250,000.
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handbooks to determine comparative negligence, most parties involved in traffic acci-
dents settled. To strike a balance between optimal deterrence and saving administrative
costs, making pain and suffering damages predictable and reasonable is arguably
second-best, as Ramseyer (2015) suggests.
While most people would agree that $1 dollar or $1 trillion for pain and suffering
damages are unreasonable, in most real-world cases, it is hard to make persuasive argu-
ments that the court-adjudicated awards are reasonable or not. Unless a barometer can
be developed to measure and compare pain and suffering and a reliable formula can be
used to inform decisionmakers how much money is sufficient to ease pains, assessing
reasonable pain and suffering damages is an impossible mission.
Consequently, policymakers should focus on the predictability of pain and suffer-
ing damages. Predictability does not ensure optimal deterrence, but unpredictability
dooms optimal deterrence. Predictability also facilitates settlements. Unpredictability
increases health insurance premiums that further make certain efficient actions unsus-
tainable (Bovbjerg et al. 1988:908; Geistfeld 1995:786; Avraham 2006:95–97). Damages
based on tables or formulas are generally predictable, but not all jurisdictions have fol-
lowed this scheme—for countries such as Taiwan and the United States, it is worth
exploring whether discretionary pain and suffering awards connect to measurable
factors.
There are two types of predictability: statistical and legal. Statistical significance of
key variables and high goodness of fit make pain and suffering damages predictable in a
statistical sense. Yet to be predictable in a legally relevant way, the key variables have to
be easily measured by parties before litigation and closely related to the legal issue. For
instance, medical expenses and levels of injury are arguably good proxies for pain and
suffering, and they are easily ascertainable by the two parties without judicial adjudica-
tion. Below we demonstrate that pain and suffering damages in Taiwan are to a large
extent statistically and legally predictable. Granted, the R-squares of our OLS models
are not close to 1, and a few variables, such as plaintiffs’ comparative negligence, have
counterintuitive signs and statistical significance. These types of variables make pain and
suffering damages statistically predictable but perhaps less legally predictable, as com-
parative negligence is difficult to ascertain by the two parties and its effect would sur-
prise them.
Connections between pain and suffering damages and objective factors have been
infrequently studied, probably because detailed data rarely are available.3 That is, wheth-
er pain and suffering damages are statistically predictable is understudied. Prior empiri-
cal investigations of pain and suffering damages utilize datasets from insurance
companies (Viscusi 1988), insurance regulators (Kritzer et al. 2014), U.S. state court
datasets (Hans & Reyna 2011), court cases (Cohen & Miller 2003; Leiter et al. 2012;
Flatscher-Th€oni et al. 2013, 2014), or combinations of sources (Kritzer et al. 2014). With
3Sharkey (2005:448--49) notes that although the National Center for State Court Project has tried to code the
components of economic and noneconomic damages, the data were so incomplete that the Center would rather
not publish them.
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the exception of some sources used in Kritzer et al. (2014) and Cohen and Miller
(2003), the prior studies lack detailed information about pain and suffering and pecuni-
ary damages. The major determinants of pain and suffering damages thus remain
unclear.
Using randomly sampled cases from Taiwan, we provide two innovative analyses of
pain and suffering damages. First, we obtained detailed breakdowns of damages catego-
ries and assessed their influences on pain and suffering damages. This unique dataset
enables us to test empirical conjectures made by torts scholars that have not been able
to be put to tests before. The observational research design does not allow us to make
causal inferences. Yet showing correlation (or lack of) among certain important varia-
bles is an important step in further understanding the determinants of torts damages
and a stepping stone for future scholars to design their researches to make causal infer-
ences. We find that proxies of pain and suffering—medical expenses and the level of
injury (minor vs. serious injury)—are associated with pain and suffering damages. The
strength of the medical expenses correlation is important for two reasons. Medical
expenses are inherently related to pain and suffering, and their association suggests a
coherence to the damages system. In addition, medical expenses outperform other
pecuniary components of damages in explaining pain and suffering. This is evidence of
judges filtering out components of pecuniary damages that are less likely to be associat-
ed with pain and suffering. We also find that the victims’ annual incomes, among other
factors, were not influential. The absence of association with income is important
because it avoids providing higher-paid workers with greater pain and suffering damages
than lower-paid workers. Victims in medical malpractice cases tended to receive more
pain and suffering damages than those in car accident cases, consistent with scholarly
conjecture. Victims’ ages are negatively correlated with pain and suffering damages in
medical malpractice cases.
Second, our data include the amount of pain and suffering damages requested by
plaintiffs. Using structural equation models that can control for the endogeneity prob-
lem, we find that as the plaintiffs’ requests for pain and suffering damages increased,
the judges awarded more.
Our Taiwan dataset is rare in being a non-U.S. source of pain and suffering dam-
ages information. We exploit these novel data by comparing the Taiwan results with
analogous data from U.S. trial outcomes. We find little evidence that noneconomic dam-
ages form a higher percentage of total damages in the United States than in Taiwan.
We do, however, present evidence that noneconomic awards, by both U.S. juries and
judges, are higher per unit of economic damages than those in Taiwan, all by judges (as
there is no jury system in Taiwan as of 2015). This research thus extends the prior pain
and suffering literature to the study of career judges in a civil-law country.
The predictability of pain and suffering damages in a certain jurisdiction is not
readily generalizable. A study on judicial behaviors, however, reveals patterns that other
jurisdictions might share. We posit that judges endeavor to give rational awards but at
the same time may be influenced by biases and heuristics. (A fuller explanation of our
theoretical account of judges’ behaviors will come in Section III.) The contribution of
this article is to demonstrate the predictability of pain and suffering damages in a
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country where such damages are subject to judges’ discretion. The judicial decision-
making patterns revealed by our study could inform researchers in other countries with
comparable torts damage systems.
Section II of this article describes Taiwan’s law relating to pain and suffering dam-
ages. Section III addresses our hypotheses and methodology. Section IV reports and dis-
cusses our results. Section V addresses the results’ relation to U.S. data, and Section VI
concludes.
II. Taiwan’s Pain and Suffering Damages Law
Pursuant to Articles 193 and 195 of the Taiwan Civil Code, victims of a tortious act can
request the tortfeasor to pay pecuniary damages and pain and suffering damages.4 For
example, medical doctors can be liable to compensate a patient for both types of dam-
ages if they failed to diagnose the patient with cancer or other major diseases. Courts in
Taiwan5 break down damages in such cases into 10 subcategories, as shown in Table 1.
We will occasionally use the labels in Table 1 to refer to damages types.
No table or formula exists for courts to determine the amount of pain and suffer-
ing damages. The Civil Code provides no guidance. A few leading cases rendered by the
Supreme Court of Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s declared that the following factors
Table 1: Types of Awarded Damages
Label Expense Type Expense Item
A1 Already incurred Medical treatment and operation
A2 Already incurred* Nursing care, medical devices, and nutritious food
E1 Estimated future Medical treatment and operation
E2 Estimated future* Nursing care, medical devices, and nutritious food
A3 Already incurred Victim’s lost salary during hospitalization and recovery
E3 Estimated future Victim’s future lost salary (discounted to present value or paid as annuities),
if the tortious act decreases the victim’s capability to work and earn
A4 Already incurred Increased traveling expenses (e.g., taxi fares to and from hospitals)
A5 Already incurred Property damages (e.g., repair fee for damaged cars)
E4 Estimated future Other expenses (including, among others, increased traveling expenses)
PS Pain and suffering damages
*A2 and E2 can each be further divided into nursing care, medical devices, and nutritious food, but during the
coding process, we pool these three items together.
SOURCE: Chang et al. Pain and Suffering Damages Data Set 2015.
4Taiwan Civil Code Art. 193I promulgates: “If a person has wrongfully injured another and caused the injured
person to lose or decrease his laboring capacity or to increase the necessary living expenses, the tortfeasors shall
compensate the injured person.” Taiwan Civil Code Art. 195I prescribes: “If a person has wrongfully infringed
the body, health, reputation, liberty, credit, privacy or chastity of another, . . . the infringed party may claim rea-
sonable pain and suffering damages.”
5Judges in Taiwan are career judges who serve on the bench after passing a judiciary examination and receiving
training for two years. As of December 2015, there is no jury system in Taiwan, though a pilot program on intro-
ducing a “lay observer system” is under way (Huang & Lin 2013).
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should be considered: the socioeconomic status, total assets, annual income, age, educa-
tional background, and the like of both sides, the plaintiff’s level of pain and harm, the
victim’s negligence, the defendant’s repentance, and so on. Other than these factors,
no conventional wisdom or rules of thumb exist for quantifying pain and suffering to
date. In practice, the plaintiff generally simply claims an amount and contends that it is
just, with little supporting evidence. The court decisions usually start with a template dis-
cussion that carbon-copies the list of factors emphasized by the leading cases,6 then
summarize the facts of the case at hand, and award an amount at the end. As judges
have never elaborated their formulas and rarely provided concrete information regard-
ing the factors, it is doubtful to what extent those factors listed in the template argu-
ments affect the final amount of pain and suffering damages. In other words, the
factors prescribed by the Taiwan Supreme Court failed to enhance legal predictability.7
Courts in Taiwan will review the receipts of all pecuniary expenses and only grant
plaintiffs reasonable expenses. Due to the mandatory national health-care system that
covers most medical treatments and medication, only medical expenses that are not cov-
ered by the health-care plans (such as co-payment, certain special medicines and opera-
tions, and domestic nursery care) can be recovered by the victim from the tortfeasor.
Plaintiffs do not have an incentive to claim unrealistically high amounts of pain
and suffering damages. First, filing fees are proportional to the amount of claimed total
damages (roughly, around 1 percent of the total claimed damages).8 Second, the losing
party has to pay filing fees. In a tort lawsuit, a plaintiff usually has to pay part of the fil-
ing fee if the court does not grant all her claims. The plaintiff generally has to pay [1 –
(court award/plaintiff’s claim)] 3 filing fee. Hence, claiming a high amount of pain
and suffering damages increases both the filing fee and the probability of bearing a
higher percentage of the filing fee. Nevertheless, plaintiffs expecting the return rate of
overclaiming to be higher than 1 percent will still overclaim.9 One important caveat:
when a plaintiff makes pain and suffering damages claims as part of the criminal pro-
ceedings against a defendant, and the defendant was found guilty, the plaintiff does not
have to pay filing fees for her civil lawsuit in the court of first instance.
6Not all courts use the same template. The factors that a court explicitly claims to take into account slightly
differ.
7In unreported tables, we explored the factors that Taiwanese courts purport to have considered in determining
pain and suffering damages. The information provided in the written court decisions is often insufficient to
detect meaningful association between those factors and the amount of pain and suffering damages. That is,
aided by regression models, we still cannot ascertain whether these factors are statistically predictable.
8Pursuant to Article 77-13 of the Civil Procedure Code of Taiwan, the filing fee is assessed in the following way:
1. A fixed fee of NTD 1,000 for any claim that is worth NTD 100,000 or less (>5 1 percent). 2. A 1.1 percent fee
for the part of the claim that is above NTD 100,000 and no larger than NTD 1,000,000. 3. The filing fee rates
decrease to 0.99 percent, 0.88 percent, 0.77 percent, and 0.66 percent, when the value of the claim hits the
threshold of NTD 10 million, NTD 100 million, and NTD 1 billion, respectively. For all the cases in our dataset,
the filing fee is slightly higher than 1 percent of the worth of the claims.
9One of us, in another article, uses the expected judicial award predicted by hedonic regression models as the
baseline to measure whether plaintiffs overclaim (Chang et al. 2015).
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Taiwan can generally be considered a civil-law country. Almost all judges are career
judges who may or may not have (most have not) practiced law before serving on the
bench. Most jurists in Taiwan major in law as an undergraduate, and only a minority of
jurists are trained in a JD-like graduate program. Jurists who pass the bar exam (its pass-
ing rate has always been below 11 percent) and finish six months of practical training are
qualified to practice law. Jurists who pursue a career as judges or prosecutors have to take
the court officer examination. Those who pass the examination receive training in the
Academy for the Judiciary for two years. At the end of their training, based on their
grades, preferences, and available openings, they will become judges or prosecutors. Judg-
es are tenured, and thus presumably less influenced by external political influences. For
civil matters, there are three levels of courts: district courts, appellate courts, and the
supreme court. The former two can determine both questions of fact and questions of
law, while the supreme court only deals with questions of law. Appealing to the appellate
court is as of right, whereas large-stake cases represented by attorneys can be appealed to
the supreme court, subject to its discretion (Eisenberg & Huang 2012; Chen et al. 2015).
III. Hypothesis and Methodology
A. Major Research Questions
Our core empirical question is to identify the major determinants of court-adjudicated
pain and suffering damages. Our dataset contains detailed information regarding the
components of damages (in every case, we can break down total damages into 10 com-
ponents; see Table 1). Hence, we can measure the association of pain and suffering
damages with various factors holding others constant. Although we explore the associa-
tion of several factors with pain and suffering damages, a purely kitchen-sink approach
is not preferred. A behavioral theory of judicial decision making in nonpecuniary dam-
ages would inform the empirical strategy. Lack of demographic information about the
judges prevents us from directly testing any demographic theory. We instead focus on
how the victims’ behaviors, characteristics, and litigation strategies affect the amount of
pain and suffering damages.
1. Severity of Injury as Proxy for Pain and Suffering
Our first conjecture, based on discussions with dozens of judges in all three levels of
courts in Taiwan, is that judges consciously base the amount of pain and suffering dam-
ages on the severity of injury. “Severity of injury” in this article represents an abstract
standard that varies among judges and is not specified by any statute, regulation, or
court precedent. Indeed, no criterion has been explicitly endorsed by any court deci-
sions.10 As long as judges make a common-sense judgment of severity of injury, the
severity of injury shall be associated with certain quantifiable measures, such as medical
10There are a few ways to measure percentage of lost earning capacity, as discussed below, but most cases in our
dataset do not involve assessment of lost earning capacity.
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expenses and level of injury (minor vs. serious injury). Our first hypothesis is that both
the medical expenses and level of injury are positively associated with pain and suffering
damages.
The level of injury and medical expenses are our proxies for the severity of injury,
not necessarily the judges’. Statistically significant and positive relations between these
proxies and the amount of pain and suffering damages, however, would suggest that no
matter which criterion judges used to render their decisions, the criterion must be high-
ly correlated with our proxies. We use both proxies because a dummy variable capturing
two levels of injuries is insufficiently sophisticated to capture the variety of injuries.
Within each level of injury, the medical expenses, a continuous variable, serve to pro-
vide a more refined categorization of the severity of injury. Using medical expenses
alone as a proxy, on the other hand, would fail to capture the categorical differences
between a minor injury and a serious injury.
That the levels of injury and pain and suffering damages are positively correlated is
empirically plausible11 and should be justifiable, while the relation between medical
expenses and pain and suffering damages is less obvious. Avraham (2006:112–14) conjec-
tures that pain and suffering damages might be positively correlated with medical expenses
(see also Epstein 1999:442; Flatscher-Th€oni et al. 2013), but points out that the data avail-
able then only enabled researchers to test pain and suffering damages versus all kinds of
pecuniary damages mixed together. Kritzer et al. (2014) provide a review of the relevant
literature and a rare study of the relation between noneconomic damages and economic
damages. They report a mixture of consistent and inconsistent patterns across multiple
datasets. Kritzer et al. (2014:38) conclude that “there tends to be considerably more vari-
ability in the relationship between non-economic and economic damages than between
punitive and compensatory damages.” Our detailed data allow us to assess which subcate-
gory of pecuniary damages is most strongly correlated with pain and suffering damages
and test whether Avraham’s (2006) conjecture is empirically valid.12 The association should
be normatively acceptable, to the extent that the medical expenses capture the severity of
injury well (we do not have external criterion to verify this) and as long as the medical
expenses in our dataset are not constrained by the income or wealth of the victim.13
11Vidmar et al. (1998:283, 296) adopt a nine-level injury classification used by U.S. National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners (NAIC) and find a consistent relationship between the jury verdict awards and the level of
injury in several jurisdictions in the United States. Flatscher-Th€oni et al. (2013:110, 117) adopt the same injury-
level classification and find similar results in Austria.
12Note that although pain and suffering damages in the United States could be assessed by judges or juries (see
Section V), what Avraham (2006) has in mind might be jury awards. In this sense, our data on court-adjudicated
pain and suffering damages in Taiwan cannot be used to test the claim. In Section V, though, we compare our
Taiwan data with the U.S. data to shed light on this issue.
13Summary statistics shown in Table 2 demonstrate that the medical expenses are not as high as a U.S. reader
would guess, as the mean is USD 15,514 and the median is USD 2,904. The highest several medical expenses con-
sist mostly of estimated future nursing care (E2). That means that at the time of litigation, the victim did not yet
have to pay for it. Once the tortfeasor compensates the victim, the latter can afford to pay for the necessary nurs-
ing service.
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2. Other Predictors
In addition to the level of injury, which we hypothesize to exert the most influence on
the amount of pain and suffering damages, other factors may affect the assessed amount.
Again, while we cannot establish causation with this research design, associations can be
explored. Two predictors are explored here; others are discussed in Section IV.
First, a victim’s age could be a predictor of pain and suffering damages, but theo-
retically it is unclear whether judges should take age into account. Avraham (2006:111)
champions a system in which age is negatively correlated with pain and suffering dam-
ages, other things being equal, as permanent injuries produce more total pain for youn-
ger victims. Nonetheless, according to the adaptation theory (Bronsteen et al. 2008;
Ubel & Loewenstein 2008:S198–S202; Ariely 2011:157–90), most victims’ happiness levels
return to their preinjury stage, or at least rebound, after a few years (but see Huang
2008). Hence, age is largely irrelevant for total pains. Although we cannot examine
whether victims adapt, our data enable us to test whether judges consider age to be rele-
vant to total pain.
Second, adjudicators may use plaintiffs’ future lost income as a reference point. If
this is the case, white-collar workers would tend to receive more pain and suffering dam-
ages, although it is unclear whether high-wage earners suffer more pain than the
low-wage earners for a given bodily injury, and whether the rich would need more com-
pensation to ease their pain (Avraham 2006:114). Pecuniary damages to property would
be another example of dubious factors. In lawsuits involving car accidents, such a refer-
ence would give Lexus owners more pain and suffering damages than Toyota owners.
Some prior empirical papers have found that objective losses positively correlated with
pain and suffering damages. Hans and Reyna (2011:141), using U.S. state court data,
found that the amount of noneconomic damages is positively correlated with that of
pecuniary damages. Other empirical studies have also found that jury-determined pain
and suffering damages are often some multiple of the plaintiff’s pecuniary losses or at
least significantly correlated with the pecuniary losses (Bovbjerg et al. 1988; Viscusi
1988:210–11; Geistfeld 1995:787).14 The data used in these prior studies are not suffi-
ciently refined to tease out the different effects of medical expenses and nonmedical
expenses such as lost income and property damages.
3. Anchoring Effect by Plaintiffs’ Claims
We do not assume that judges are always rational. Most judges would prefer to give rea-
soned decisions. Nevertheless, in tasks such as assessing pain and suffering damages,
where a large amount of awards have to be determined without clear guidelines, judges
might also be subject to the spell of heuristics. In other words, the court-adjudicated
pain and suffering damages may not be entirely rational.
Psychological experiments have shown that, other features held constant, the
higher the requested amount of compensation (the ad damnum clause), the higher the
14For a critique of this practice, see, e.g., Geistfeld (1995:787).
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jury verdict (Campbell et al. 2014). This is the well-known anchoring effect (Ariely
2008:25–48; Kahneman 2011:119–28).15 That is, another number, even an arbitrary or
irrelevant one, might influence the amount of pain and suffering damages.
In a tort lawsuit that leads to awards of pain and suffering damages, several num-
bers exist and potentially become anchors. We submit that the plaintiff’s requested
amount of pain and suffering damages is more likely than other amounts to serve as an
anchor. Plaintiffs’ requested amounts are directly related to the issue. Thus, before a
judge turns to how much pain and suffering damages to award, she would need to
remind herself of the requested amount (as her adjudicated amount cannot surpass the
requested amount). This makes the requested amount more likely to anchor a judge’s
decision. Our hypothesis is that as judges have to determine a number without legisla-
tive guidance, plaintiffs’ requests, holding constant other variables, have a substantial,
statistically significant, and positive effect on the pain and suffering award. This empiri-
cal examination has strong policy implications. Plaintiffs in a handful of states in the
United States are not allowed to bring up the ad damnum clause (Franklin et al.
2008:299). Yet in many other states, plaintiffs can specify a dollar amount, on the
assumption that juries or judges are free to regard it as irrelevant (Diamond et al.
2011:150–52). The existence of the anchoring effect in the real (legal) world would sug-
gest that the effect is too strong for judges and juries to resist and that the current prac-
tice of assessing pain and suffering damages is not normatively flawless.
A caveat is in order. Judges are likely to be influenced by meaningful and mean-
ingless anchors (Rachlinski et al. 2006), but most literature focuses on the meaningless
anchors, whereas the experimental researches that study meaningful anchors are able to
isolate the effect of meaningful anchors by holding other factors strictly constant. In an
observational study like ours, it is difficult to control for everything. Although, as elabo-
rated below, the structural equation model used can control for the endogeneity prob-
lem, the plaintiffs’ requested amount of pain and suffering damages itself contains both
the meaningful and meaningless parts—the former reflect the true pain and suffering
while the latter capture the exaggeration. Yet we have no reliable method to tease out
the portions of these two parts. Hence, even when the plaintiff claim variable is statisti-
cally significant, we do not know which parts drive the result. The strongest claim we
can make is only that the statistically significant result is consistent with the experimen-
tal literature in finding an effect of meaningless anchors.
B. The Data
All civil cases decided by the district courts in Taiwan since 2000 are available for down-
load on the official website of the judicial administration (Judicial Yuan) of Taiwan.16
15For introduction to the anchoring effect in law, see, e.g., Teichman and Zamir (2014). Other legal studies that
found the anchoring effect in legal settings include Guthrie et al. (2000), Wistrich et al. (2005), and Rachlinski
et al. (2007).
16http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/FJUD/ (website in Chinese).
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Using carefully chosen keywords,17 we limited the district court cases yielded by our
search to ones the plaintiff won and ones rendered between January 1, 2008, and
December 31, 2012. The research period was chosen because other research teams in
Taiwan have collected data on similar issues before 2008 and are collecting data on simi-
lar issues resolved in appellate courts. Our data thus fill in a potential data gap. More-
over, we focus on decisions by the court of first instance. As emphasized by Guthrie
et al. (2007:4) and Eisenberg and Heise (2015), most cases are handled by the court of
first instance. Many of these decisions are final in that they are not appealed. Such cases
avoid the selection issues that arise in studying appellate cases, for example, the parties’
decisions to appeal and settle cases pending appeal. Small claim and summary proceed-
ing cases are excluded because the judgments in these cases usually do not contain
enough information about the cases.
We searched for and coded pain and suffering damages cases related to personal
injury. Death cases were excluded because they are doctrinally and substantively differ-
ent.18 We limited our search to two types of tort cases—medical malpractice and car
accident—to focus on negligent (rather than intentional) infringements that have simi-
lar background facts within the categories. Medical malpractice is a hotly debated tort
issue in many jurisdictions, whereas car accident cases are numerous and thus not trivial.
After irrelevant cases were filtered out,19 44 medical malpractice cases that ended with
an award of positive pain and suffering damages were found and coded. By contrast,
more than 3,000 car accident cases showed up in our search. We coded a random sam-
ple of one-tenth of the car accident cases. To assure geographic representation of the
whole country, we stratified the sample by judicial district to obtain 10 percent of car
accident cases from each of the 20 jurisdictions. This resulted in 297 car accident cases
in our dataset. A few cases have multiple plaintiffs. In 18 of the 341 observations, victims
were in persistent vegetative state. Scholars and judges may have very different views
regarding whether these victims should be awarded pain and suffering damages or how
much discount or premium should be given to them. We thus omit these 18
observations from the following analysis.20 The total number of observations is thus
17The search terms are, of course, in Chinese and hard to translate. The literal translation of the search terms
for car accident cases are: (road traffic OR traffic accident OR car accident NOT state responsibility) AND (Article 195 OR
Article 194) AND (defendant pays OR defendants jointly pay). The literal translation of the search terms for medical
malpractice cases are: (medical dispute OR medical incident OR medical malpractice) AND (defendant pays OR defendants
jointly pay).
18Under Taiwan law (Civil Code Art. 194), claimants for pain and suffering damages in death cases are the
deceased party’s spouse, children, and parents, not the deceased party’s estate or heir. Also, in death cases, the
deceased party may neither experience long pain and suffering nor spend on medical expenses.
19In some cases, the plaintiffs did not request pain and suffering damages. Our search terms also capture cases
in which the tort victims were dead---these cases are analyzed in Chang et al. (2015b).
20In Section V, when comparing the Taiwan data with the U.S. data, we include the vegetative state cases, as there
is no sufficient information to exclude this type of cases from the U.S. data.
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323.21 Unreported regression analysis reveals that the results are essentially the same if
these 18 observations are taken into account.
We examined whether substantial differences in awards existed across 12 court dis-
tricts.22 There was no significant difference in the ratio of pain and suffering damages to
non pain and suffering damages across the courts (Kruskal-Wallis p 5 0.33; ANOVA (natu-
ral log of ratio) p 5 0.19).23 The absence of difference persisted when we subdivided the
sample into car accident cases and medical malpractice cases. The absence of intercourt
difference persisted when using the ratio of pain and suffering damages to total damages.
As Figure 1 shows, the pain and suffering damages awarded in car accident cases
by courts in Taiwan exhibit a somewhat bell-shaped distribution (after a natural log
transformation) around USD 10,000.24 The skewed distribution supporting the natural
log transformation is typical of unbounded award outcomes. The pain and suffering
damages in medical malpractice cases, if awarded at all, were no less than USD 3,333
(100,000 NTD). In all but three cases, courts in Taiwan awarded pain and suffering
damages in multiples of 100,000 NTD. The most common amounts were 100,000,
150,000, 200,000, 300,000, 400,000, and 500,000 NTD. By contrast, court-adjudicated
medical expenses ended with two or more zeroes in only 17 cases. This preference for
round numbers in noneconomic damages is consistent with Hans and Reyna’s
(2011:133–37) gist-based model of juries.
Table 2 provides selected summary statistics of the dataset. Panel A summarizes
continuous variables and Panel B summarizes categorical variables. Car accident cases
comprise 90 percent of the sample and medical malpractice cases 10 percent.
C. Regression Models
1. One-Equation Models
We report regression models that account for stratifying the sample by court district, the
10 percent sampling of car accident cases, and the nonindependence of observations in
cases with more than one plaintiff. The dependent variable is the natural log of the judge’s
pain and suffering damages award. The independent variables control for types of
21This gives us a large enough sample size for the structural equation model according to the conventional rules
of thumb (such as a minimum sample size of 100 or 200, 5 or 10 observations per estimated parameter, and 10
observations per variable) (see generally Wolf et al. 2013).
22We combine 12 of the 20 courts to produce a set of four dummies for courts that have few observations. The
combinations are based on geographic proximity and similarity in economic development. In total, (20 --
12)1 45 12 court districts were used.
23In a regression model that accounts for the sample design, the p value is 0.49.
24Throughout this article, the conversion rate is USD: Taiwan dollars5 1:30.
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pecuniary damages, characteristics of both parties, and the nature of the tort action.25 Year
and court fixed effects are also included. The models take the following form:
PSD 5 b01 b1INJURY 1 b2PEC 1 b3PL 1 b4DF 1 b5TYPE 1 b6Di 1 b7Dt 1 e;
where PSD is the natural log26 of pain and suffering damages; INJURY reflects the sever-
ity of injuries; PEC are variables representing pecuniary damages in natural log form;
Figure 1: Distribution of court-adjudicated pain and suffering damages in Taiwan
personal injury cases.
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NOTE: Amounts are in USD and the figure includes 323 Taiwan court cases decided from 2008 through 2012.
SOURCE: Chang et al. Pain and Suffering Damages Data Set 2015.
25Oren Bar-Gill suggests to us that whether the victim was present in the courtroom and whether the victim’s injury
is visible to the judge may affect the amount of pain and suffering damages. From the written decisions, we can
hardly tell whether the victim was present. We interviewed a few attorneys and judges, and were informed that most
attorney-represented victims do not show up in the courtroom. Although a few self-represented victims would try to
show their scars to the judges, most plaintiffs rely on photos and medical reports to demonstrate their injuries
because the tort lawsuits usually take place months after the accident, and most wounds would have healed. We go
back to the written decisions and try to code a dummy variable on whether the injury would be visible, and it turns
out that (at least part of) the injuries in almost all cases are visible. Therefore, we do not change our models.
26We transform all damages and expenses into natural log forms to promote normality. Unreported regression
models use un-logged damages and expenses, but the residuals exhibit heteroscedasticity, violating the assump-
tion of OLS models.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Continuous Variables
N Mean Median SD Min. Max.
Court-adjudicated PS damages* † 323 11,599 6,667 12,484 167 66,667
Plaintiff’s requested PS damages * † 322 52,497 16,667 371,171 667 6,333,334
% of plaintiff’s PS request awarded† 322 50 40 30 0 100
Court-adjudicated medical expenses*†
(A11A21E11E2)
300 15,514 2,904 49,318 10 532,907
Court-adjudicated past lost salary* † (A3) 130 5,936 3,512 7,399 115 53,900
Court-adjudicated future lost salary* † (E3) 83 53,295 27,491 71,755 800 374,874
Court-adjudicated nonmedical expenses* †
(A41A51E4)
217 4,351 1,765 6,657 4 53,900
Years of permanent lost earning capacity 55 25 25 13 3.6 65
Annual income used to compute future
lost salary*†
54 10,143 7,512 5,296 6,000 33,070
% of lost earning capacity † 55 0.5 14 0 0 65
Number of plaintiffs 323 1.2 1 0.6 1 7
Number of defendants 323 1.1 1 0.5 1 4
% of plaintiff’s negligence 323 0.2 0 0.2 0 0.8
Plaintiff’s age 94 39 36 0 2 87
Panel B: Categorical Variables
N %
Defendant is a minor (parents vicariously liable) 323 2.5
Corporate defendant 323 20
Plaintiff with attorneys 323 41
Defendant with attorneys 323 32
Tort Types 323
Body injury 319 99
Fail to diagnose latent illness 4 1.2
Case Types 323
Car accident 290 90
Medical malpractice 33 10
Injury Types 323
Minor injury 251 78
Serious injury 72 22
Type of Plaintiffs (Car Accidents Cases Only) 288
Sedan driver/sedan passenger 19 6.6
Other 269 93.4
Type of Plaintiffs II (Car Accidents Cases Only) 288
Pedestrian 41 14
Driver 204 71
Passenger 43 15
Year 323
2008 52 16
2009 64 20
2010 69 21
2011 62 19
2012 76 24
*In USD.
†Only amounts greater than zero are included.
NOTE. PS5pain and suffering. The “A1” and similar abbreviations are explained in Table 1. Amounts column
reports amounts adjusted to reflect the use of a 10 percent sample for car accident cases. N varies due to missing
information. Eighteen cases where the victims were in permanent vegetative state are excluded from this table.
SOURCE: Chang et al. Pain and Suffering Damages Data Set 2015.
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PL and DF are several variables capturing the characteristics of the plaintiff and the
defendant, respectively; TYPE are a few variables controlling for the nature of the dis-
pute, particularly the tortious acts; and Dt and Di are dummy variables indicating the
years and court jurisdictions of the case, respectively. The coefficients to be estimated
are bn; e is an error term. We report robust standard errors clustered by cases.
More specifically, INJURY includes a variable that is the natural log of court-
adjudicated medical expenses, a dummy variable that equals 1 if court-adjudicated medi-
cal expenses are zero, and a dummy variable capturing whether the victims suffered
from minor injuries (5 0) or serious injuries (5 1). Medical expenses include the costs
of medicine, doctor visits, hospital expenses, medical devices, nursing care, and nutri-
tious food (A11A21E11E2). Expenses of nursing care are often higher than other
subtypes of medical expenses combined in serious injury cases. Thus, medical expenses
are more exactly “medical and caring expenses.” For brevity’s sake, we use medical
expenses to refer to A11A21E11E2.
Minor injuries and serious injuries are distinguished based on the standard stipulated
in the Criminal Code of Taiwan. That is, a serious injury is one of the following conditions:
1. Destruction of or serious damage to the sight of one or both eyes; 2. Destruction of or
serious damage to the hearing of one or both ears; 3. Destruction of or serious damage to
the functions of speech, taste, or smell; 4. Destruction of or serious damage to the function
of one or more limbs; 5. Destruction of or serious damage to the power of reproduction;
and 6. Other serious injury to body or to health that is either impossible or difficult to cure.
PEC includes one variable, the natural log of nonmedical expenses, which is used
in the first two regression models. Future lost salary (E3) is decomposed into three ele-
ments: “number of years of lost earning capacity” (using a square root transformation to
promote normality), “plaintiff’s annual income” (in natural log), and “percentage of
lost earning capacity,”27 and they are used in one model.
PL includes a variable on the percentage of plaintiffs’ contributory negligence (in
our dataset, from 0 to 0.75) and a dummy variable on whether plaintiffs retain attor-
neys. A variable on plaintiffs’ ages and a dummy variable indicating whether plaintiffs’
ages are missing are included, as are an interaction term of plaintiffs’ ages and a dum-
my variable on serious injury. In one model using only car accident cases, three more
variables are used:28 a dummy variable on whether the plaintiff drove a sedan or other
motor vehicle such as a taxi and a truck; and two variables that distinguish whether the
plaintiff was a pedestrian, passenger, or driver.
27In some cases, victims lose working and earning capacity only for a few years. In the regression models, we use
the three component variables of the future lost salary only if the victim loses part of the capability permanently
(there are 64 such observations).
28We have coded many details regarding the car accidents such as the vehicles used by plaintiffs and defendants
during the accidents. We are not aware of any good theory that predicts whether these factors will or will not
affect the judges’ decisions. A lot of degrees of freedom would be consumed if all of these variables are included
in models. We select these three variables based on least angle regression, a model-building algorithm that values
parsimony as well as accuracy (Efron et al. 2004). It is worth emphasizing that other variables in the models are
chosen based on their theoretical importance.
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DF includes the natural log of the number of natural-person defendants; a dum-
my variable for whether the defendants include a corporation; a dummy variable for
whether the defendant is a minor and whether his/her parents are vicariously liable; a
variable on the number of medical doctor defendants; and a dummy variable for wheth-
er the defendants are represented by attorneys. We also distinguish whether the party
was a driver, a passenger, or a pedestrian.29
TYPE includes a dummy variable that indicates whether it is a car accident case or
a medical malpractice case; another dummy variable further distinguishes, in medical
malpractice cases, whether doctors performed substandard treatments/operations or
failed to diagnose a latent cancer/illness.
Dt is a series of dummy variables (one for each year) that controls the timing of
the judgment. Di are a series of court dummy variables that control for the variance
among jurisdictions.
We report four models. The first model uses both the car accident cases and med-
ical malpractice cases. The second model uses only the car accident cases and adds a
few variables to test whether the other facets of the accidents influence the damages
awards. The third model uses only the car accident cases and, on the one hand, con-
tains selected variables from the first model, but, on the other hand, adds three more
variables related to victims’ future lost salary. The fourth model uses only the medical
malpractice cases. Due to the small number of observations, this final model is parsimo-
nious, using only the few key variables.30
2. Structural Equation Model
Our data include the amount plaintiffs requested in pain and suffering damages. Such
information has not been available in prior pain and suffering studies. Due to endoge-
neity, we do not include it in the above single-equation regression models. The
requested amount is not independent of other explanatory variables such as medical
expenses and level of injury. However, the requested amount is of obvious interest and
potential importance. It might be expected to influence the awarded amount in two
ways. First, higher requested amounts put higher numbers before the judge. Anchoring
theory suggests that higher requested numbers will be associated with higher awarded
numbers independently of the merits of an increased award. Second, higher requested
amounts may be associated with factors that should increase awards but are not repre-
sented by observable variables in a single-equation regression model. The plaintiffs, in
formulating the requested amount, may have access to information about the degree or
29In unreported regression models, we also include the plaintiff’s and defendant’s annual incomes. There are
many missing values for annual income of plaintiffs and defendants. Including these variables in the regression
models would greatly reduce the number of observations and degrees of freedom. Thus we exclude them in the
reported models. In unreported models, parties’ incomes are not statistically significant in OLS and SEM models.
30Plaintiffs’ comparative negligence could not reasonably be included in Model (4) because it had a nonzero val-
ue in only one case. Recall that Model (4) is about medical malpractice, and naturally the plaintiff/patient is
infrequently negligent.
214 Chang et al.
nature of pain and suffering that we cannot observe. To account for the more complex
relationship among the variables in models that include plaintiffs’ requests and to con-
trol for the endogeneity problem,31 we employ a structural equation model,32 which
takes the following form:
PSD 5 a01 a1CLAIM 1 a2INJURY 1 a3PECs1 a4PLs1 a5DFs1 a6TYPEs1 e
CLAIM 5 b01 b1INJURY s1 b2PLs1 b3TYPEs1 b4PLA 1 e
PSD and INJURY represent the same variables as in the single-equation models. CLAIM
is the natural log of plaintiffs’ requested amount of pain and suffering damages.
INJURY, PL, and TYPE with a subscript s represent selected variables from the single-
equation models. PLA includes plaintiffs’ claimed medical expenses and a dummy vari-
able on whether such expenses equal zero.
IV. Findings and Discussion
A. Medical Expenses and Level of Injury Best Explain Pain and Suffering Damages
Table 3’s models indicate that medical expenses are highly statistically significantly asso-
ciated with pain and suffering damages (p< 0.001 in all but the last model). For Models
(1), (2), and (4), a 1 percent increase in medical expenses is associated with about a
0.25 percent increase in pain and suffering damages. The first-row graphs in Figure 2
demonstrate that the quadratic fitted line for medical expenses and pain and suffering
damages is almost straight, suggesting that the relation between the two logged variables
is close to linear.33
Unlike medical expenses, nonmedical pecuniary damages do not have statisti-
cally significant association with pain and suffering damages. Figure 2 provides a
graphical exposition of the lack of association, particularly in the case of minor
31An endogeneity problem occurs when an explanatory variable is correlated with the error term. If the
“independent variable” is correlated with the error term in a regression model, the estimate of the regression
coefficient in OLS regression may be biased. There are many methods of correcting the bias, including instru-
mental variable and structural equations regression. The models we are considering are known as a recursive sys-
tem (Wooldridge 2010:228); the identification of these models is guaranteed. Endogeneity arises as a result of
the recursive model specification. Using OLS for recursive systems does not give the most efficient estimates so
better estimation methods are usually applied.
32Economists refer to models that combine explicit economic theories with statistical models as structural econo-
metric models. The estimation method we are applying is called structural equations modeling (SEM). The
results of the structural equations are estimated simultaneously by the Stata command “sem” (acronym for structur-
al equation models) or “gsem” (acronym for generalized structural equation models). The term “generalized” is
more like generalized linear models---that is, regression models for nonnormal data. This should not be confused
with general linear models, which are for normal-distribution-based linear models with a full covariance matrix
that is to be estimated along with the linear effects---these types of models include the two-stage least square mod-
el. An alternative is the two-stage least squares estimation; however, we use the SEM approach.
33Unreported regression models include a quadratic term, the square of natural log of medical expenses, but this
variable is not statistically significant.
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Table 3: Regression Models of Court-Awarded Pain and Suffering Damages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Cases Car Only Car Only Med-Mal Only
Dependent variable: natural log of court–adjudicated pain and suffering damages
5 1 if serious injury 0.516*** 0.654*** 0.572* 0.555
(0.134) (0.168) (0.223) (0.371)
Medical expense (ln) 0.267*** 0.253*** 0.180*** 0.235*
(0.027) (0.028) (0.048) (0.108)
5 1 if medical expense is zero 1.899*** 1.781*** 1.120 2.546*
(0.367) (0.360) (0.672) (1.207)
Age 0.005 0.005 20.016*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
Age * Serious injury 20.007
(0.006)
5 1 if age missing 0.151 0.085 20.9091
(0.208) (0.202) (0.468)
Nonmed. pecun. exp. (ln) 0.015 0.016
(0.013) (0.013)
% of P’s negligence 0.558** 0.505** 1.090**
(0.196) (0.189) (0.313)
Number of natural-person D 0.208 0.268 20.244
(0.164) (0.189) (0.458)
5 1 if corporate defendant 0.065 0.065 0.5531
(0.131) (0.133) (0.324)
5 1 if parents vicarious liable 0.179 0.064
(0.186) (0.200)
Plaintiff had lawyer 0.017 0.035
(0.112) (0.113)
Defendant had lawyer 0.309** 0.334**
(0.118) (0.118)
Medical malpractice case 0.598**
(0.229)
% earning capacity lost 20.068
(0.367)
Plaintiff annual income 0.110
(0.154)
Yrs. lost earnings (sq. rt.) 20.012
(0.044)
Failure to diagnose 0.338
(0.582)
N of doctor defendants 0.185
(0.201)
Constant 8.423*** 8.506*** 9.116*** 10.223***
(0.411) (0.422) (2.053) (1.340)
Court and year fixed effects Yes Yes No No
P driving types No Yes No No
Observations 323 288 51 33
R2 0.583 0.606 0.748 0.518
NOTE. P 5 plaintiff; D5defendant. Models (1) and (2) account for the court strata, the differential sampling of
car accident and medical malpractice cases, and the nonindependence of multiple plaintiff cases. Models (3)
and (4) do not account for strata due to single-observation strata. Models (3) and (4) cluster standard errors
based on case. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; 1p< 0.1.
SOURCE: Chang et al. Pain and Suffering Damages Data Set 2015.
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injuries.34 Regression results reported in Table 3 also corroborate with the figure. These findings
underpin the conjecture that judges emphasize medical expenses over nonmedical expenses.
The level of injury (minor injury or serious injury) is statistically significant, except
in Model (4), which has only 33 observations, all medical malpractice cases. The sign and
magnitude of the coefficients in Models (1)–(3) indicate that victims with serious injuries
receive 52–65 percent more pain and suffering damages than those with minor injuries.
Note that Model (3) in Table 3 has many fewer observations than Model (2) since
there are many missing values in the percent earning capacity lost, plaintiff annual income,
Figure 2: Scatterplots of court-adjudicated medical expenses (first row) and nonmedical
pecuniary expenses (second row) versus pain and suffering damages.
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NOTE: Both X-axis and Y-axis are in USD and transformed to log 10. The first row of graphs shows the relation
between pain and suffering damages and total medical expenses. The second row of graphs shows the relation
between pain and suffering damages and nonmedical pecuniary expenses. The curve in each plot plots the pre-
diction for pain and suffering damages from a linear regression of pain and suffering damages (log 10) on
(non)medical expenses (log 10) and their squares (the qfit command in Stata). Observations in which medical
costs5 0 are excluded. The columns show the data by characterization of injury. The figure includes 311 Taiwan
court cases decided from 2008 through 2012.
SOURCE: Chang et al. Pain and Suffering Damages Data Set 2015.
34The lower bottom graph in Figure 2 may suggest that the relationship between natural log of pain and suffering dam-
ages and natural log of nonmedical pecuniary damages is quadratic. An unreported OLS model adds the square of the
latter into Model (2) in Table 3. Neither variable on nonmedical pecuniary damages is statistically significant.
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and years lost earnings variables. Only in the cases in which the victims ask for future lost
salary would the court determine these factors. In addition, 38 of the 290 car accident
cases have missing percent earning capacity lost, and the other two variables have a similar
pattern. The composition of the missing and the nonmissing groups must be different and
there may be some underlying selection. Since the regression models only include percent
of earning capacity if it is permanent, the nonmissing group tends to have more serious
injuries. In addition, victims in the nonmissing group tend to be working adults, not retir-
ees or children. The main takeaway from Model (3) in Table 3 is that even within the non-
missing group, the effects of medical cost and injury level still dominate those of the
percent earning capacity lost, plaintiff annual income, and years lost earnings.
Medical expenses and level of injury are highly associated, as shown in Figure 3. The
statistical significance of both the serious injury dummy variable and the medical expense
variable suggest that when the medical expenses are the same, victims with serious injuries
receive more pain and suffering damages than those with minor injuries. Also, within the
injury category, higher medical expenses predict higher pain and suffering damages.
Note that medical expenses are unlikely to influence judicial decisions by being
an anchor, as such expenses are a combination of several types of incurred and
expected medically-related expenses. Their sums are not computed in the written judg-
ments. That is, medical expenses are not one number (but several different numbers)
for judges. That being said, as we discuss below, judges may still suffer from the anchor-
ing effect (created by plaintiffs’ claims) and may adjust the amount of pain and suffer-
ing damages according to factors that are normatively harder to justify.
Figure 3: Court-adjudicated medical expenses by injury level.
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SOURCE: Chang et al. Pain and Suffering Damages Data Set 2015.
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B. Accounting for Plaintiffs’ Requested Pain and Suffering Damages
We now explore whether, in addition to the other influences on the pain and suffering
award, the plaintiff’s pain and suffering damages request is associated with the judge’s
pain and suffering award. We cannot meaningfully model the defendant’s counterclaims
concerning pain and suffering damages35 due to their variety and lack of explicit
amounts.36 At least three reasons suggest that the request should be relevant. First, judg-
es will not award more than the plaintiff’s request. The request therefore caps the pain
and suffering award and should be nonrandomly associated with it. Second, plaintiffs
have an incentive to make reasonable pain and suffering requests because the filing fee
increases as the requested amount increases. Third, the medical or other pecuniary
damages that inform a pain and suffering request are known to the plaintiff, as are oth-
er intangible aspects of the case.
Because the requested amount is not independent of other damages factors, we
use a structural equation approach in which the structural equation includes the plain-
tiff’s requested pain and suffering amount and an additional equation that models the
plaintiff’s requested amount as a function of objectively observable factors. Table 4
reports the results. The model accounts for the sample design, as described above.
The model is analogous to Table 3’s first model to facilitate comparing the effect
of including the requested pain and suffering amount with a model that does not
include the requested amount. The pain and suffering award equation uses key explana-
tory variables from Model (1) in Table 3, but drops insignificant variables. The results
of the structural equation model largely confirm what is found in the OLS model. The
effects of plaintiffs’ claims and attorney representation warrant more discussion.
1. Evidence for the Anchoring Effect
The award equation in the structural equation model shows a strong, significant associa-
tion between the requested pain and suffering award and the actual pain and suffering
award. This is evidence that the plaintiff’s request, independent of objective measures of
pain and suffering, is associated with the judge’s pain and suffering award. The request
equation models the plaintiff’s requested pain and suffering damages. Rather than using
court-adjudicated medical expenses, it uses the natural log of the plaintiff’s claimed
medical expenses, in addition to a dummy variable that equals 1 when such expenses
are zero. The judge’s award is not used as an explanatory variable because the award is
unknown when the plaintiff makes a damages request. The presence of a lawyer for the
defendant is not included in the model because the plaintiff does not know whether
the defendant has a lawyer when the damages request is made. The request equation
35Diamond et al. (2011:174) find that juries are less inclined to reject the defendant’s claim than the plaintiff’s
claim.
36An unreported table shows that almost half the defendants simply counter that plaintiffs’ claims are too high.
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shows that the request is significantly associated with other explanatory variables in the
award equation. This is, of course, plausible since the same principal factors that influ-
ence the judge’s award likely influence the plaintiff’s request.
The association between a plaintiff’s pain and suffering request and higher pain and
suffering awards could be interpreted as evidence of an anchoring effect.37 After objective
measures of the qualitative nature of harm and the quantitative monetary loss are
accounted for, the size of the requested amount remains associated with the judge’s pain
and suffering award. Absent an experimental setting, it is difficult to isolate a pure anchor-
ing effect from other unobservable factors that may increase the judge’s pain and suffering
award. Thus, our finding is consistent with the psychological literature on anchoring, but
it is not affirmative evidence that the anchoring effect exists in litigation.38
In the anchoring interpretation, judges are thought to follow the “anchor and adjust”
procedure (Tversky & Kahneman 1974:1128). That is, judges use the plaintiff’s request as the
starting point and adjust it by taking into account medical expenses and other factors we found
statistically significant. Judges, however, make insufficient adjustments and thus award plain-
tiffs with more pain and suffering damages than they otherwise would without the anchor.
The anchoring effect is normatively problematic. It increases legal unpredictability
of damages awards (Avraham 2006:95). Like cases are treated not alike simply because
plaintiffs for whatever (often strategic) reasons claim higher. The existence of a possible
anchoring effect also suggests that though judges have, overall speaking, done an admi-
rable job in basing pain and suffering damages on factors that are highly relevant to the
victims’ pain, judges are still human, and they fall under the spell of anchors.
2. Attorney Influence
The model also suggests the mechanism through which lawyers may affect the judge’s
pain and suffering award amount. Table 2 shows that only 39 percent of plaintiffs had
attorneys. The plaintiff having a lawyer is not significant in models of the pain and suf-
fering award (Table 3). Nonetheless, it is highly significant in the equation modeling
the requested pain and suffering amount (Table 4). This suggests that the lawyer effect
is indirect and not readily detected in single-equation models (such as Models (1) and
(2) in Table 3). The presence of a plaintiff lawyer increases the request, which in turn
increases the judicial award.39 (A single-equation model that includes the pain and
37This finding is consistent with the experimental result on the same issue reported in Chapman and Bornstein
(1996). But compare Diamond et al. (2011:174), who find that juries in the Arizona Jury Project are more
inclined to reject the plaintiff’s request than the defendant’s counterclaim, particularly regarding the pain and
suffering damages. They conjecture that the general suspicion about plaintiffs may be at work there.
38One of us, using a more refined empirical strategy and a different dataset, tries to tease out the anchoring
effect in real-world settings (Chang et al. 2016). We defer the job of identifying the anchoring effect outside the
laboratory to that article.
39Our finding of a positive association between pain and suffering recoveries and the presence of an attorney is
consistent with O’Connell and Simon’s (1972:23--24) finding such an association in automobile accident cases.
Their early study lacked the specific controls available to us.
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suffering request yields results consistent with those in Table 4). The dummy variable
on whether defendants retain attorneys is statistically significant in the OLS model
reported in Table 3, while it is not statistically significant in the structural equation mod-
el reported in Table 4. One of us, in another paper, focuses on teasing out the effect of
attorney representation and attorney experience in torts litigation (Chang et al. 2015);
thus, we will not go into further detail here.
Having a lawyer is associated with a higher requested damages amount. Nevertheless,
having a lawyer is not in itself exogenous since lawyers may be sought in and attracted to cases
with higher damages. To check the influence of the mechanism by which lawyers are selected,
we used Stata’s generalized structural equation modeling feature (the gsem command) to add
Table 4: Structural Equation Model Relating to the Requested Pain and
Suffering Award
Pain & Suffering
Award
Pain &
Suffering Request
Total Effects of
Variables on Awards
(A) (B) (C)
Plaintiff’s pain and suffering request
(natural log)
0.440*** 0.440***
(0.053) (0.053)
5 1 if serious injury 0.253* 0.404** 0.430***
(0.108) (0.134) (0.121)
Medical expenses (allowed by
the court; natural log)
0.210*** 0.210***
(0.027) (0.027)
5 1 if medical expenses are zero 1.527*** 1.527***
(0.339) (0.339)
% of P’s negligence 0.592*** 0.279 0.714***
(0.160) (0.234) (0.195)
5 1 if defendant has lawyer 0.075 0.075
(0.095) (0.095)
5 1 if medical malpractice cases 0.205 1.062*** 0.673***
(0.178) (0.215) (0.173)
Plaintiff’s claimed medical expenses 0.264*** 0.116***
(0.039) (0.018)
5 1 if plaintiff’s claimed medical
expenses are zero
2.728*** 1.201***
(0.561) (0.225)
5 1 if plaintiff has lawyer 0.282** 0.124*
(0.101) (0.051)
Constant 3.928*** 9.864***
(0.607) (0.447)
Observations 322
Coefficient of determination 0.589
NOTE. The model is a structural equation model with the pain and suffering award and request modeled simulta-
neously. The model accounts for the court strata, the differential sampling of car accident and medical malprac-
tice cases, and the nonindependence of multiple plaintiff cases. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p< 0.001;
**p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; 1p< 0.1.
SOURCE: Chang et al. Pain and Suffering Damages Data Set 2015.
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equations modeling whether plaintiffs and defendants had lawyers. We assumed that the
stakes of the case would be most influential to a lawyer’s presence for plaintiffs. For the plain-
tiff lawyer equation, the explanatory variables we used were whether the plaintiff was seriously
injured, the total damages other than pain and suffering, and the degree of the plaintiff’s
fault. For the defendant lawyer equation, we added to these variables whether the defendant
was a corporation and whether the plaintiff had a lawyer. The results reported in Table 4 did
not materially differ when these equations were added.40
C. Lost Income and Pain and Suffering
Cases in which victims request compensation for reduced earning capacity are an important
subset of observations. For permanent reduction in earning capacity, courts usually award the
victim a lump sum consisting of lost salary from the time of judgment to the mandatory retire-
ment age,41 discounted to present value. The compensation is mainly based on three factors:
years until retirement, current annual salary, and percentage of lost earning capacity. To
determine the percentage, courts often rely on the “schedule of impairment” declared by a
government agency for labor insurance purposes.42 The annual salary is a matter of proof.43
One might expect that the percentage of reduced earning capacity would serious-
ly compete with or supplement medical expenses and the level of injury as measures of
victims’ pain and suffering. The more one loses earning capacity, the more pain and
suffering (due to the injury itself and the sense of fulfillment from working) one may
incur. On the other hand, a bodily impairment that causes substantial suffering may not
always reduce earning capacity. Losing an eye may be a case in point. Thus, in some
cases, reduced earning capacity may be an inadequate proxy for pain and suffering. It is
therefore of interest to address the relation between earnings and pain and suffering in
more detail. Model (3) in Table 3 includes three measures of permanently reduced
earning capacity: annual income, percentage of lost earning capacity, and years of lost
earning capacity. The regression result shows that they do little to add to medical
expenses and injury levels as an explanation of pain and suffering.44
40Plaintiff being represented by a lawyer was significantly associated with serious injury. Defendant being repre-
sented by a lawyer was significantly associated with whether the plaintiff had a lawyer and whether the defendant
was a corporation.
41The mandatory retirement age was 60 years old before April 2008 and 65 years old since then.
42In 34 percent of the cases, courts explicitly refer to such a schedule.
43In 56 percent of the cases, courts use the victim’s actual preinjury salary. In 40 percent of the cases (usually
with minor victims), courts use the minimum wage to calculate lost salary.
44We have tried several other unreported model specifications, but the results are consistent: as long as the dum-
my variable representing injury levels and the medical expense variable are included in the regression models,
none of the three variables regarding future lost salary are statistically significant. In unreported models, we have
replaced the three component variables with one variable that captures the amount of total future lost salary.
The result is essentially the same.
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The insignificance of the three components of future lost salary is empirically
unsurprising and normatively acceptable. Regarding annual income, utility theorists
have posited how the utility of a given dollar changes when the rich become poor and
when a healthy person is injured (see also Posner 2011:251–53). Yet before more solid
empirical evidence of utility changes appears, judges can understandably regard the
amount of salary as irrelevant to pain and suffering.45
In addition, percentage of lost earning capacity is itself correlated with positive amount
medical expenses (r5 0.724; p< 0.001; N5 59), which strongly correlate with pain and suffer-
ing damages (r5 0.704; p< 0.001; N5 311). Intuitively, judges have no obvious reason to give
victims who lost more earning capacity higher pain and suffering damages, once judges have
accounted for the severity of the victims’ injuries. Another reason for the insignificance of lost
earning capacity might be that the percentage of lost earning capacity is ascertained in only
about 17 percent of our observations, so we do not have sufficient statistical power to sort out
its effect. Finally, the number of years of permanently lost earning capacity is highly correlated
with the victim’s age, but because not all victims work or claim lost income, the number of
observations that contains years of lost earning capacity is not large. The statistical insignifi-
cance of this variable might be attributed to the lack of statistical power. Below we will demon-
strate that the victim’s age is sometimes a statistically significant variable.
D. Other Variables of Interest
Other than plaintiffs’ comparative negligence, none of the variables besides medical
expenses and injury levels are consistently statistically significant at the 5 percent level.46
We discuss three interesting aspects of the empirical results below.
A few words regarding optimal deterrence here. Shavell (2004:240) notes that to
attain optimal deterrence, courts may award expected losses if they cannot ascertain actual
losses in individual cases. If judges aim to award expected losses (and largely ignore the var-
iation of facts across cases), in cases where pecuniary damages are low, courts might be
inclined to award higher pain and suffering damages, so that the overall compensation
awards would be similar across cases, creating specific deterrence for the tortfeasors. By con-
trast, if judges aim to award actual losses, low pecuniary damages would often come with
low nonpecuniary damages, as victims in those cases may not have been seriously injured.
Our dataset suggests that judges in Taiwan appear to aim for compensating victims for their
actual losses. The Pearson correlation coefficient between pecuniary damages and pain and
45Avraham (2006:114) has argued that it is unjustified to base pain and suffering damages on incomes. Note also
that the Pearson correlation coefficient between natural log of plaintiff incomes and natural log of court-
adjudicated medical expenses is only 20.087. Thus, the lack of statistical significance of the plaintiff income vari-
able cannot be attributed to the presence of medical expenses in the model.
46Unreported regression models show that the annual income of both parties does not have statistically signifi-
cant effects on the amount of pain and suffering damages. We have tried to use both “positive income only” and
“positive plus no income” in our models. The results are the same. Note that the annual incomes used in the
unreported models here are not necessarily the same as the incomes used in the calculation of lost salary. In the
latter, sometimes courts do not use the actual annual income (such as when the victim was not working). Some-
times, victims who are working do not claim for lost salaries.
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suffering damages is 0.636 (p< 0.001). Unreported scatterplots and the positive coefficients
for medical expenses and nonmedical expenses in Table 3 also provide a consistent story.
1. Victim’s Fault
One interesting issue is whether the victim’s own fault influences the amount of pain and
suffering damages. In Taiwan, judges take into account the plaintiff’s comparative negli-
gence at the end of the damages computation process. That is, the various types of damages
are first determined and summed, and then the deduction percentage (the comparative
negligence attributed to the victim) is applied across the board.47 The plaintiff’s compara-
tive negligence thus reduces both her pecuniary and her pain and suffering damages.
Figure 4 shows the relation between pain and suffering damages and the percent
of negligence attributed to the plaintiff (0–75 percent in our dataset). It does not show
a strong association between the two, but the positive slope of the line is puzzling. It is
counterintuitive for judges to increase the amount of pain and suffering damages when
the victim herself is more at fault. The regression models reported in Tables 3 and 4,
Figure 4: Percentage of plaintiff’s negligence and compensation level.
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224 Chang et al.
however, confirm the figure; the comparative negligence variable is statistically signifi-
cant and is consistently positive.
The bunching of observations at zero fault for plaintiffs led us to explore models
that also included a dummy variable that equals 0 when the plaintiff’s fault was nonzero
and 1 when it was zero. Neither the zero-fault dummy variable nor the fault variable are
statistically significant. Nevertheless, in the regression model that contains only the 123
observations in which plaintiffs are at fault, the fault variable is still statistically signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level. Perhaps the cases with highest plaintiff fault resulted in
more pain and suffering that is not captured by our injury-related variables. Negligence
by the defendant and substantial negligence by the victim might lead to worse results
than in cases in which the victim is modestly negligent or not negligent.
Another possible explanation arose in a round-table discussion with several of Tai-
wan’s most experienced judges. A few judges suggested that judges may be compassion-
ate toward the tort victim and, despite the victim’s own fault, be unwilling to
substantially reduce the postdeduction compensation. Hence, judges may award higher
pain and suffering damages than they otherwise would in anticipation of the fault-based
reduction.48 The result of the structural equation model, reported in Table 4, echoes
with this compassion theory: plaintiffs do not claim higher when they are more at
fault—it is judges who increase the pain and suffering awards when plaintiffs are more
at fault. A caveat, however, is in order. While plaintiffs more or less know whether they
are at fault and to what extent they are comparatively negligent, they cannot accurately
predict their levels of court-adjudicated fault. We use the court-adjudicated fault in the
plaintiff-claim equation in the structural equation model because there is no other way
to ascertain plaintiffs’ evaluation of their fault at the time of their claims.
2. Victim’s Age
We discussed above whether the length of enduring pain would influence the amount
of the pain and suffering damages. There, the length is measured by the years of lost
earning capacity. Here, we use the victim’s age as an approximation.
The effect of age may vary, depending on the nature of injury. If the injury is persistent,
the victims are likely to suffer for the rest of their lives. Their ages are likely to be negatively
correlated with the pain and suffering awards, as judges may reason that those with more years
ahead of them may feel more total pain over their whole lives. By contrast, provided that the
injury is not persistent, after some years victims may adjust to the body impairment and their
pain and suffering decreases—this is the psychological theory of adaptation (Sunstein
2008:S191). The pain and suffering damages thus will not correlate with victims’ ages.49
48Sharkey (2005:391) hypothesizes an analogous effect when laws cap damages, pointing out that “where noneco-
nomic damages are limited by caps, plaintiffs’ attorneys will more vigorously pursue, and juries will award, larger
economic damages, which are often unbounded.”
49Interestingly, the Tribunals of Milan and Rome in Italy use tables to compute the pain and suffering damages
for personal injuries. The damages decrease with age. We thank Alice Guerra for this information.
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Our findings to some extent confirm the aforementioned hypothesis. As Figure 5
shows, in serious injury cases, pain and suffering awards are indeed negatively correlated
with the victims’ ages. When victims suffer from minor injuries, courts appear to have a
different approach toward age. In car accident cases, the victims’ ages are positively cor-
related with pain and suffering awards, while in medical malpractice cases, the victims’
ages are negatively correlated.
Regression results confirm the scatterplot. In medical malpractice cases, Model (4)
in Table 3 shows that age has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. As for car accident cases, Models (1) and (2) in Table 3 show that victim ages and
the interaction term of ages and serious injury are not statistically significant. The signs of
the age variable and the interaction term are positive and negative, respectively.
The puzzle lies with the different effects of age. In car accident cases, no matter
whether the victims suffered minor or serious injuries, their ages have no statistically sig-
nificant effect. It appears that judges subscribed to the adaptation theory, perhaps
believing that even victims who suffer from persistent pain (more likely to correlate with
serious injuries in our coding) would return to the preinjury hedonic level in a few
years. This would be counterevidence to “adaptation neglect” (Sunstein 2008:158). In
Figure 5: Victim age, case type, injury type, and pain and suffering damages.
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medical malpractice cases, adaptation theory cannot explain the results. There, judges
appeared to believe that pain and suffering will never subside, thus total expected life
matters. Hence, younger victims were given more pain and suffering damages. Our data,
with many missing values, do not enable us to fully untangle this puzzle.
3. Car Accident Versus Medical Malpractice
Car accident cases and medical malpractice cases exhibit different patterns. Figure 1
and unreported statistics show that the mean, median, and 25th and 75th percentiles of
pain and suffering damages in the medical malpractice cases are higher than those in
the car accident cases. The case type dummy variable in our regression model (Model
(1) in Table 3) is statistically significant, again suggesting that, other things being equal,
the medical malpractice cases are associated with more pain and suffering damages.
Avraham (2006:95) has conjectured that victims in car accident cases might
receive less pain and suffering damages than those in medical malpractice cases because
being injured in a special relationship causes more pain. As Koehler and Gershoff
(2003) find, human beings are “betrayal averse.” Medical doctors are “agents of
protection.” When doctors mistreat patients and become “agents of harm,” people feel
more painful toward the injury than the same level of injury incurred without betrayal.
This conjecture is borne out by our data. The structural equation model reported in
Table 4 provides a more nuanced explanation: the different pain and suffering awards
are mainly driven by plaintiffs’ claims; that is, plaintiffs claim more pain and suffering
damages in medical malpractice cases. More specifically, the total effect is the sum of
the direct effect and the indirect effect—the direct effect measures the influence of a
variable directly on court awards, whereas the indirect effect measures the influence of
a variable on court awards through its influence on the plaintiff’s request (Freese &
Kevern 2013:31). The medical malpractice dummy variable has strong total and indirect
effects but a weak direct effect. This suggests that plaintiffs take into account the case
type in claiming pain and suffering damages. The weak direct effect suggests that judges
do not disagree with plaintiffs’ judgments regarding the effect of case type on pain and
suffering damages. The highly statistically significant total effects suggest that case types
ultimately influence the court-adjudicated pain and suffering damages.
E. Pain and Suffering Damages as a Percentage of Total Damages
The prior literature on pain and suffering damages and the literature on the relation
between ordinary damages and punitive damages have focused on the percentage of
“subjective” damages (i.e., the pain and suffering damages or the punitive damages) in
total damages. Figure 6 contains two sets of box plots in which the horizontal line repre-
sents the median value of the percentage of damages consisting of pain and suffering
damages and the boxes show the interquartile range. The left-hand box plots show the
pain and suffering award as a percentage of the combined pain and suffering award
plus medical expenses. The right-hand box plot shows pain and suffering awards as a
percentage of the total award.
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For car accident cases, the median percentage of pain and suffering damages in
relation to medical expenses is about 70 percent and the 25th percentile is near 50 per-
cent. So, in about 75 percent of the cases, the pain and suffering damages exceed the
medical expenses. For medical malpractice cases, the median percentage of pain and
suffering damages in relation to medical expenses is over 90 percent and the 25th per-
centile is over 70 percent. In almost all the medical malpractice cases, the pain and suf-
fering damages exceed the medical expenses. The right-hand box plot in Figure 6
indicates that, for car accidents, in about 50 percent of the cases, pain and suffering
damages exceed pecuniary damages (including nonmedical expenses and lost salary). In
medical malpractice cases, pain and suffering damages exceed pecuniary damages in
about 90 percent of the cases. Section V discusses the results in comparison to U.S.
results.
Figure 6: Pain and suffering damages as percentages of damages.
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NOTE: PS5pain and suffering. The figure shows the distributions of pain and suffering awards as percentages of
damages by tort type. In these box plots, the horizontal line in each box is the median value or 50th percentile.
The height of the box is a measure of spread of the distribution, called the interquartile range or IQR. It shows
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1.5 times the IQR. Data points above and below the whiskers are considered outliers. The figure includes 290 car
accident cases and 33 medical malpractice cases decided in Taiwan court cases from 2008 through 2012.
SOURCE: Chang et al. Pain and Suffering Damages Data Set 2015.
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V. Relation to U.S. Trial Outcomes
We have information about the relation between pain and suffering damages and pecu-
niary loss, as shown across the range of pecuniary loss in Figure 2 and as summarized in
Figure 6. Given the attention devoted to the behavior of U.S. juries with respect to pain
and suffering damages payments, it is of interest to compare the outcome of Taiwan tri-
als to that of U.S. trials. Doing so requires using a dataset that contains reasonably
detailed information on U.S. trial outcomes. Data that specifically focus on pain and suf-
fering awards are rare (Avraham 2006), so we use a dataset that reports on economic
and noneconomic damages, of which pain and suffering damages are the major
component.
The U.S. dataset for this part of our study comes from the Civil Justice Survey of
State Courts, a National Center for State Courts-Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) project
that has yielded four major datasets. The Civil Justice Survey gathered data directly from
state court clerks’ offices on tort, contract, and property cases disposed of by trial in fis-
cal year 1991–1992 and in calendar years 1996, 2001, and 2005. Each of these time peri-
ods corresponds to a separate BJS dataset. The first three datasets covered state courts
of general jurisdiction in a random sample of 46 of the 75 most populous counties in
the United States. The 2001 Civil Justice Survey data included 46 counties; the 1991–
1992 and 1996 data included 45.50
The 2005 Civil Justice Survey data used here included 156 counties. The 2005 sur-
vey included 46 of the 75 most populous counties selected to maintain backward com-
patibility with the earlier Civil Justice Surveys. The 2005 survey expanded coverage by
adding 110 counties to represent the 3,066 smaller counties not included in the coun-
try’s 75 largest counties.51 The 2005 data included all completed trials in the studied
counties. The 2005 data included 8,872 trials of an estimated total of 27,128 in state
courts in the United States in 2005, or 32.7 percent. Based on the sample design, the tri-
als from the 46 counties are estimated to represent 10,813 general bench and civil trials
disposed of in the nation’s 75 most populous counties. Trials from the 110 smaller
counties are estimated to represent 16,315 general civil and bench trials from outside
the nation’s 75 most populous counties (BJS 2008; authors’ calculations).
We extracted from the 2005 data information about economic damages and non-
economic damages for automobile accident cases and medical malpractice cases, the
two case categories in the Taiwan data. Given the concern about the high fractions of
damages in the United States that consist of pain and suffering awards (Bovbjerg et al.
1988:207–08; Avraham 2006), it is interesting to compare the percentages of damages
50For a summary of the data and methodology, see Bureau of Justice Statistics (1995, 1996, 2004). The initial Civ-
il Justice Survey dataset (1991--1992) includes only jury trials. The two subsequent datasets, 1996 and 2001,
include jury and bench trials. The three datasets include all completed trials in all three years in most of the
counties.
51For a summary of the data and methodology, see Bureau of Justice Statistics (2008) and Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research (2009).
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that consist of pain and suffering awards in the Taiwan trials data with the fractions of
damages that consist of noneconomic damages in the U.S. trials data. Panel A of Table
5 reports the results for automobile cases and Panel B reports the results for medical
malpractice cases. For the BJS data, we report results separately for judge trials and for
jury trials.
To those who attribute to U.S. juries unusually high percentages of damages awards
that consist of noneconomic damages, the results should be startling. Professional judges
in Taiwan’s civil-law system do not award meaningfully lower noneconomic damages as
fractions of recoveries than do U.S. juries.52 Even within the United States, the table pro-
vides no evidence of meaningful differences between judges and juries. Too few U.S.
judge-adjudicated medical malpractice cases exist to support inferences about that category
of cases, but the other table rows contain a reasonable number of cases.
Other differences between the two legal systems caution against hasty conclu-
sions based on the two countries’ data. For example, to the extent that the measure of
noneconomic damages in the U.S. data includes components other than pain and suf-
fering,53 the percentage of U.S. awards that consist of pain and suffering is systemati-
cally lower than the percentages in Table 5. This suggests that pain and suffering
awards by Taiwan judges likely are a higher percentage of total damages than are pain
Table 5: Percentage of Damages Consisting of Noneconomic Damages
Mean Median SD N
A. Car Cases
Taiwan car (this study) 50 48 28 297
U.S. jury car (BJS) 49 51 25 532
U.S. judge car (BJS) 51 52 24 21
B. Medical Malpractice Cases
Taiwan medical (this study) 73 92 34 45
U.S. jury medical (BJS) 67 73 28 81
U.S. judge medical (BJS) 72 81 29 5
NOTE: Taiwan data are from court cases from 2008 through 2012. U.S. data are from BJS (2008), which consists
of state court trials ending in 2005. Cases where victims are in a permanent vegetative state are not excluded
from this table.
SOURCE (Taiwan data): Chang et al. Pain and Suffering Damages Data Set 2015).
52The absence of difference may be partially attributable to U.S. states’ statutory damages caps, as two of the 532
jury trials on car accidents and 33 of the 81 jury trials on medical malpractice were affected by state laws capping
damages. According to BJS (2008), MA, MO, MT, LA, NE, OH, SD, TX, WV, IN, FL, and CA have statutory dam-
ages caps in medical malpractice cases, whereas MI, KS, CO, NM, SC, and VA have broader statutory caps on
nonpecuniary damages. Hawaii enacted statutory caps for pain and suffering damages.
53As Kritzer et al. (2014) note, many state legislatures have defined additional categories of noneconomic dam-
ages, including disfigurement, loss of society, and loss of consortium. The codebook for BJS (2008) does not
define nonpecuniary damages. See http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/file?comp5none&study523862&ds5
0&file_id51069839&path5NACJD (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
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and suffering awards by U.S. juries and judges.54 On the other hand, Taiwan’s national
health-care system covers most routine medical treatments and medication (see Section
II), so the medical expense portion of pecuniary damages in Taiwan likely is lower than
that portion of pecuniary damages in the United States for similar injuries. The relatively
lower medical expenses tend to make pain and suffering damages a higher percentage of
total damages than in the United States. Put differently, the percentage of Taiwan awards
that consist of pain and suffering would be, again, systematically lower than the percen-
tages in Table 5 if the tortfeasors have to pay to the victims the medical expenses covered
by the national health-care system. Despite these and other systemic differences, our results
are evidence suggesting the absence of dramatic differences in the percentages of noneco-
nomic damages awarded in the two countries.
Figure 7: Relation between noneconomic and economic damages, Taiwan and the
United States.
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SOURCE (Taiwan data): Chang et al. Pain and Suffering Damages Data Set 2015).
54Pain and suffering awards were found to not constitute a high proportion of awards in Illinois medical malpractice
cases (Vidmar et al. 2006).
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Similarity extends to another important feature of damages, the relation between
noneconomic damages and economic damages. Figure 7 contains scatterplots of that
relation for the Taiwan and U.S. data. The first row’s graphs cover automobile accident
cases and the second row’s graphs cover medical malpractice cases, with U.S. cases again
separated by judge and jury trial. Each subfigure also shows the best-fitting regression
line from a simple regression of noneconomic damages as a function of economic dam-
ages. To facilitate comparison, the figure shows the Taiwan damages in USD and uses
common x and y scales for all graphs.
Figure 7 confirms strong associations between economic and noneconomic dam-
ages in the datasets. All scatterplots, except that of five medical malpractice judge-tried
cases, suggest a significant positive relation between economic and noneconomic dam-
ages. As noted in our discussion of the Taiwan case results, increasing noneconomic
damages likely reflect greater noneconomic losses being associated with greater pecuni-
ary harm, or anchoring on the pecuniary loss, or a combination of the two. Simple
regression models, reported in Table 6, confirm the figure’s impression. Each model
contains a single explanatory variable, economic damages, and either noneconomic
damages (U.S. data) or pain and suffering damages (Taiwan data) as the dependent
variable.
The coefficients for medical malpractice cases across the datasets are reasonably
consistent, as shown in Panel B of Figure 7.55 But, as suggested by Figure 7’s second row,
substantially less of the variance is explained in the jury-tried medical malpractice cases.
Table 6: Regression Models of Noneconomic Damages
Coefficient Std. Err. p Value N R2
A. Car Cases
Taiwan judge car (this study) 0.359 0.023 <0.001 292 0.462
U.S. jury car (BJS) 0.917 0.038 <0.001 533 0.521
U.S. judge car (BJS) 0.946 0.107 <0.001 21 0.805
B. Medical Malpractice Cases
Taiwan judge medical (this study) 0.293 0.060 <0.001 27 0.490
U.S. jury medical (BJS) 0.258 0.083 0.003 81 0.109
NY Cty. 1.026 0.182 <0.001 14 0.726
Cook Cty. 0.370 0.111 0.004 20 0.381
Other counties 0.087 0.104 0.408 47 0.015
U.S. judge medical (BJS) 0.110 0.234 0.670 5 0.069
NOTE: The models all use economic damages (natural log10 USD) as the explanatory variable. Taiwan models
use pain and suffering damages (natural log10 USD) as the dependent variable. U.S. models use noneconomic
damages (natural log10 USD) as the dependent variable. Taiwan data are from court cases from 2008 through
2012. U.S. data are from BJS (2008), which consists of state court trials ending in 2005.
SOURCE (Taiwan data): Chang et al. Pain and Suffering Damages Data Set 2015).
55Kritzer et al. (2014:tbls. 3, 8) analyze additional pain and suffering datasets. The additional data come from Cook
County (Chicago), California, and other jury verdict reporters, which may have a systematic bias toward reporting large
awards. Those data for U.S. and Cook County car awards show similar coefficients to the U.S. case coefficients in Table
6. Those data for Cook County and California medical awards show similar coefficients to the medical coefficients in
Panel B except that a dataset for a mixture of non-California states results in a coefficient of 0.434 (p 5 0.031).
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This is in part a function of pooling data across heterogeneous U.S. states. Panel B breaks
down the U.S. medical case data into New York County cases, Cook County cases, and oth-
er counties’ cases.56 Among the three groups, coefficients substantially and significantly
differ, with large differences in the variance in noneconomic damages explained.
Figure 7 and Table 6 also show differences between the countries. U.S. awards are
consistently higher. Part of this difference may be due to differences in general economic
conditions. Taiwan’s 2012 per-capita purchasing power was about 74 percent that of the
United States.57 Almost no Taiwan awards exceed USD 1 million and several are less than
USD 100. The U.S. data have awards above $1 million and no awards less than $100.58
Panel A shows that the coefficient for economic damages is much smaller in Taiwan cases,
suggesting a lesser increase in pain and suffering damages per unit increase in economic
damages than in U.S. cases. Figure 7’s first row shows this difference in slopes. This differ-
ence persists in median regression models, which reduce the influence of the large U.S.
awards. The increased slope is not limited to U.S. juries as the slopes for the U.S. decision-
makers are similar and do not significantly vary (note again the small N of court-
adjudication cases in the United States) (for similar finding, see Hans & Reyna 2011). The
higher slope may be attributed to U.S. noneconomic damages in the BJS data including
components other than pain and suffering. Also, U.S. juries may be concerned that a third
or so of the damages will be paid to contingent-fee attorneys; thus, they up the ante when
determining the awards. By contrast, attorneys in Taiwan collect fixed fees (Chang & Tu
2016); thus, even compassionate judges do not have to be concerned with attorney fees.
VI. Conclusion
Concerns have been expressed in Taiwan about the variability of damages for pain and
suffering. We show that in car accident and medical malpractice cases, these damages
are strongly correlated with measurable quantities and are not numbers randomly gener-
ated by judges. The amount expended for medical expenses and the level of injury are
two key variables that explain much of the pain and suffering award. We also provide
evidence that the requested amount influences the awarded amount beyond the impor-
tant objective influences on awards. Judicial anchoring on the plaintiff’s requested
amount may increase pain and suffering awards beyond the amount forecast by observ-
able variables.
Evidence of the basic rationality of pain and suffering damages has implications
beyond Taiwan. In the United States, concerns about damages for pain and suffering
damages have led to many statutes capping damages. Caps on damages are likely to
56New York County and Cook County were the only two counties with more than six jury-tried medical malprac-
tice cases won by plaintiffs.
57International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database-October 2013, accessed Dec. 24, 2013.
58Nevertheless, median car awards in Taiwan are comparable to those in the United States: USD 17,000 in 2012
dollars compared to USD 15,000 in the United State in 2005 dollars in the BJS study.
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reduce access to counsel, given the reduced expected recoveries (Garber et al. 2009). In
the classes of cases studied in the two countries, we show that noneconomic damages in
the United States do not constitute a higher percentage of the total damages award
than do pain and suffering damages in Taiwan. Given the evidence of rationality of the
Taiwanese system, this should reduce concerns based on the substantial portion of dam-
ages consisting of pain and suffering damages in the United States (e.g., Viscusi
1988:207). Both countries’ systems show strong associations between noneconomic dam-
ages and economic damages. Reform proposals in both countries should be considered
in light of the consistent evidence of rationally functioning systems.
Concerns about pain and suffering damages in Taiwan and the United States
should also be considered in light of data from other countries. Karapanou and Visscher
(2010a) compare pain and suffering awards from European country cases with amounts
that might be awarded if a metric from health-care economics, quality-adjusted life years
(QALYs), were used.59 QALYs are based on surveys of people in various health condi-
tions. QALYs in two states of health can be compared to quantify the difference between
two states. Karapanou and Visscher (2010a) employed a conservative approach to mone-
tize differences in health conditions based on QALYs, which they use to monetize pain
and suffering. They compare their conservative estimates for amputations, spinal
injuries, and deafness to awards in court cases from Germany, Greece, Italy, and the Neth-
erlands. They conclude that pain and suffering damages in Europe are systematically too
low—in our parlance, unreasonable. Policymakers should seriously study QALYs or other
metrics that could set reasonable and predictable pain and suffering damages.
Lastly, our Taiwan data are a product of judges’ behavior; U.S. data come from
both judges and juries. Given the tendency of the media and policymakers to focus on
U.S. juries, some similarities are worth noting. Taiwan judges, U.S. judges, and U.S.
juries all produce strong statistically significant associations between noneconomic dam-
ages and economic damages. The three sets of decisionmakers also produce reasonably
similar percentages of total awards that consist of noneconomic damages. Policy recom-
mendations based solely on data relating to juries that recommend reducing their
responsibility (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1998) omit the relevant comparison group, judges.
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